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Section 7 and Administrative Law
Deference — No Room at the Inn?

1

David Mullan∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 poses
special problems for Administrative Law. What aspects of the
administrative process engage the right to “life, liberty and security of
the person”? For those that do, what constitute the principles of
fundamental justice in both a substantive and a procedural sense? Where
the procedural elements of “fundamental” justice are triggered, what is
the relationship between the constitutional standard and traditional
common law precepts of procedural fairness and natural justice? When
state interests are set up in answer to a claim of violation of the
principles of fundamental justice, within what framework should courts
consider those claims: as part of the process of delineating the scope of
the “principles of fundamental justice” or in the context of a section 1
justification where the burden of persuasion rests clearly on the state?3

*

Professor Emeritus, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University.
This paper owes much to conversations that I have had over the years with my former
co-teacher of Advanced Constitutional Law, David Stratas, and also to his paper: David Stratas,
“Constitutional Remedies in Administrative Proceedings: Supervision, Striking Sections, Policing
Discretions, Standards of Review and Prospects for the Future” (Paper delivered at the Ontario Bar
Association Conference “The Constitution in Your Administrative Law Practice”, March 2, 2004,
at 6-10). I am indebted to him for his insights, which have been a great influence on my thinking
about this issue. See also Geneviève Cartier, “The Baker Effect: A New Interface Between the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Administrative Law — The Case of Discretion” in
David Dyzenhaus, ed., The Unity of Public Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), at 61; Lorne M.
Sossin, “Reconciling Constitutional Law with Administrative Reality: The Charter and the
Dilemmas of Discretion” (Paper delivered at the Ontario Bar Association Conference “The
Constitution in Your Administrative Law Practice”, March 2, 2004); and David A. Wright,
“Evaluating Policy-Based Decisions for Charter Compliance” (Paper delivered at the Ontario Bar
Association Conference “The Constitution in Your Administrative Law Practice”, March 2, 2004).
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter the “Charter”].
3
I have written about a number of these issues previously. See e.g., “The Charter and
Administrative Law” in The 2002 Isaac Pitblado Lectures — The Charter: Twenty Years and
Beyond (Winnipeg: Law Society of Manitoba, 2004), at X-1.
1
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These are all issues that have been the subject of both judicial
scrutiny and academic commentary. In many respects, they remain
questions to which the Supreme Court has yet to provide definitive
answers. Indeed, they could each justify detailed treatment within the
time allocated to me today. However, I have chosen to confine my
remarks on this occasion to another aspect of section 7’s intersection
with Administrative Law: What standard of review should the courts
apply in reviewing decisions by statutory and prerogative authorities on
whether the right to life, liberty and security of the person is affected by
an administrative process and, in situations where the right is engaged,
whether any deprivation has been in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice? At either of these stages, is there any place for
judicial deference to the judgment of state authorities? Indeed, this is a
question that transcends section 7 and resonates whenever statutory
authorities are making decisions (including the exercise of discretion)
that have an impact on Charter rights and freedoms. As recent case law
illustrates, it is also a question that is integrally related to the role that
section 1 plays when statutory authorities are trading in Charter rights
and freedoms.
In fact, the immediate stimulus for this paper was the March 2, 2006
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Multani v. Commission
scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys.4 There, a majority of the Court, in a
judgment penned by Charron J.,5 flatly rejected any role for
Administrative Law principles and standard of review analysis in the
evaluation of claims that administrative action has violated Charter
rights and freedoms. In determining the constitutional questions that
arise from such claims, there is no room for the argument that the
reviewing court owes any degree of deference to any aspect of the
administrative process that has generated the challenge.
In this paper, I argue that this articulation of an apparently general
principle ignores other recent Supreme Court of Canada authority. As a
consequence, the Court seems to be taking inconsistent positions on the
relationship between Administrative Law and Constitutional Law review,
a situation that poses challenges for litigants, counsel and lower courts. It
is also questionable whether such a blanket denial of the relevance of
4

[2006] S.C.J. No. 6, 2006 SCC 6 [hereinafter “Multani”].
Chief Justice McLachlin, Bastarache, Binnie and Fish JJ. concurred in Charron J.’s
judgment. Justices Deschamps and Abella, in a joint judgment, concurred in the result but reached
that conclusion by a different route. The same was true of LeBel J.
5

(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d)
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Administrative Law principles to constitutional adjudication is appropriate
from broader policy perspectives. There may well be occasions where the
courts should afford deference to statutory and prerogative authorities
even when the exercise of their powers engages constitutional rights.

II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STANDARD OF REVIEW ANALYSIS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL CASES — THE BACKGROUND
For almost 20 years, the Canadian law of judicial review of
administrative action has been bedevilled by the imperative of having to
establish a standard of review as a prelude to any engagement with the
merits of the exercise of statutory (and, for that matter, prerogative)
authority. By reference to the various criteria established by the
Supreme Court as the elements of its edict that the standard of review
depends on a “pragmatic and functional” approach, which of three
standards applies to the particular exercise of authority that is subject to
judicial review — [in]correctness, unreasonableness or patent unreasonableness? As scores of Supreme Court of Canada judgments
illustrate,6 this is in no sense a self-applying or bright line delineation
exercise.
Nonetheless, ask most administrative lawyers what standard applies
when a statutory authority is dealing with constitutional (including
Charter and perhaps even Canadian Bill of Rights)7 questions and the
most likely answer is “correctness”. Why? Because, from time to time,
the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have said so. We see this most
clearly in the Supreme Court’s case law involving an issue over which
there has been considerable vacillation: the entitlement of statutory
authorities to determine constitutional questions. In the latest
pronouncement on this vexed question,8 the Court appears to have
endorsed a strong presumption in favour of tribunals having implicit
authority to deal with constitutional questions in general and Charter
questions in particular. However, irrespective of the existence of such a
6
The foundation judgment is Union des employés de service, local 298 v. Bibeault,
[1988] S.C.J. No. 101, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048, and the most authoritative more recent articulations
can be found in Dr. Q. v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, [2003] S.C.J.
No. 18, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226 and Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [1998] S.C.J. No. 46, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982.
7
S.C. 1960, c. 44.
8
Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2
S.C.R. 504.
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strong presumption, the Court’s position has always been that where
that right to consider constitutional questions exists, the standard of
judicial scrutiny of any such exercise of authority is that of correctness.9
What may, however, be critical is that, at least until Multani, most
of this case law has involved situations where the Court has been
concerned with the entitlement of statutory authorities to deal with
questions as to the constitutional validity of constitutive or relevant
legislation. It therefore seemed to be important to read the Court’s
apparent assertion of a universal standard of correctness review in a
context-sensitive manner.
Indeed, when one comes to the section 7 jurisprudence involving
judicial review of exercises of discretion engaging Charter rights and
freedoms, the picture that emerges is quite different. In this respect, the
most prominent example remains Suresh v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration).10 However, the Court’s position can be
illustrated much more simply by reference to its judgment in the
companion case of Ahani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration),11 judgment in which was delivered the same day.
As was the case with Suresh, Ahani involved the process of making
removal orders against a person who in the opinion of the Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration “constitutes a danger to the security of
Canada”, a discretion that applies even in the case of Convention
refugees. For the purposes of its analysis, the Court accepted that the
making of a removal order would engage the Charter where the subject
of the order would “face a substantial risk of torture on removal”.12
However, notwithstanding that, the Court in no way accepted the
proposition that the courts should conduct judicial review of any such
decision on a straight correctness basis.
First, the Court segmented the decision-making process into three
stages. The first stage was the ministerial determination that the person
constituted a “danger to the security of Canada”.13 This precondition to
the exercise of jurisdiction was subject to review only if “patently
unreasonable”. That meant it must have been

9
Id., at para. 31, reaffirming Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board),
[1991] S.C.J. No. 42, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5, at 17.
10
[2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter “Suresh”].
11
[2002] S.C.J. No. 4, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 72 [hereinafter “Ahani”].
12
Id., at para. 17.
13
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, s. 53(1)(b).
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. . . made arbitrarily or in bad faith, cannot be supported on the
evidence, or did not take into account the appropriate factors. A
reviewing court should not reweigh the factors or interfere merely
because it would have come to a different conclusion.14

As I have pointed out elsewhere,15 this process of segmenting the
decision-making process to remove an important element of it from the
very application of section 7 in itself has ramifications for the conduct
of judicial review of decisions, which can have an impact on the right to
life, liberty and security of the person.
However, much more directly, the Court’s pronouncement on how
courts should approach the next stage of the process suggests very
strongly the need for judicial deference to at least elements of decisions
about the reach and application of section 7. In deciding whether
someone who is a danger to the security of Canada faces a substantial
risk of torture on deportation, courts are directly determining whether
life, liberty and security of the person is at stake. According to the
Supreme Court, such decisions are “largely fact-based” and, as such,
“largely outside the realm of expertise of reviewing courts and possess a
negligible legal element. Considerable deference is therefore required”.16
What is then left in this decision-making process for those that
actually get in that door is the determination whether such a person
should in fact be deported despite the substantial risk of torture. What is
the standard of review applicable to this third stage in the process?
Ahani does not purport to answer that question nor, in fact, does Suresh.
Certainly, the Court in Suresh controversially seemed to accept the
possibility that deportation to torture might be justified “in exceptional
circumstances”.17 However, it did not go on to elaborate what standard
of review would be applied to such an exercise of discretion. Rather, it
left the question dangling by asserting that the ambit of any such

14

Ahani, supra, note 11, at para. 16.
“Deference from Baker to Suresh and Beyond — Interpreting the Conflicting Signals”
in Dyzenhaus, supra, note 1, at 21.
16
Ahani, supra, note 11, at para. 17.
17
Supra, note 10, at para. 78.
15
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“exceptional discretion” had to “await future cases”.18 It also left open
the question whether the justification for such a decision would be
evaluated in the context of “the balancing process mandated by s. 7 of
the Charter or under s. 1”.19 I will later return to the question whether it
is a necessary implication of either or both of those balancing exercises
that the Court is conducting correctness review.
Irrespective, however, of how the Court ultimately comes down on
this last question, what is clear is that even where a threat to life, liberty
and security of the person as serious as torture is in issue, there will be
(at certain levels) deference to executive judgment, particularly where
that executive judgment involves factual determinations and, one might
add, factual determinations with a national security element.
The truth, of course, is that in the world of general Constitutional
Law, this notion of deference to statutory authority assessment of
“constitutional facts” is not a novel concept. Thus, in the domain where
administrative tribunals have been called upon to make factual
determinations bearing on whether a business is federal or provincial for
division of powers purposes under sections 91 and 92 of the
Constitution Act, 1867,20 there is jurisprudence supporting not only the
initial primacy of tribunals in making such decisions but also the
obligation of reviewing courts on ultimate judicial review to give
respect or deference to at least the factual components of the tribunal’s
determination.21
More recently, the Supreme Court accepted the need for deference
to agency and executive assessment and judgment in a rather different
constitutional setting. In Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of New
Brunswick v. New Brunswick (Minister of Justice),22 the Court was

18

Id. For an instance where the Federal Court applied patent unreasonableness to the
review of this balancing exercise and refused the application for review despite the presence of a
substantial risk of torture, see Re Jaballah, [2006] F.C.J. No. 404, at para. 18, 2006 FC 346. This
judgment was criticized trenchantly by Audrey Macklin in “On rationalizing handing a human
being over to likely torture” The Lawyers Weekly (2 June 2006), at 24. However, MacKay J.
emphasized that he was only reviewing the refusal of a protection order under s. 112 of the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. The issue might well take on different
dimensions in the face of a deportation order: see para. 17.
19
Supra, note 10, at para. 78.
20
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
21
See e.g., Westcoast Energy Inc. v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1998] S.C.J. No.
27, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 322, at paras. 40-42.
22
[2005] S.C.J. No. 47, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 286 [hereinafter “Provincial Court Judges’ Assn.
of New Brunswick”].
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evaluating the implementation of its call in Reference re Remuneration
of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island23 for the
creation of judicial compensation commissions as a way of ensuring the
institutional independence of provincially appointed judges. More
particularly, the issue of principle was the role of the courts in judicially
reviewing any decision of the government rejecting or modifying the
recommendation of the independent commission.24
In Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island Reference, the Court
had accepted the entitlement of the government to reject a commission’s
recommendation provided that the decision to reject could be defended
on the standard of rationality. In Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of New
Brunswick, the Court went on to elaborate how that fed into the judicial
review process. It was not a situation where the reviewing court was
obliged to evaluate the government’s decision by reference to a standard
of correctness.
The reviewing court is not asked to determine the adequacy of judicial
remuneration. Instead, it must focus on the government’s response and
on whether the purpose of the commission process has been achieved.
This is a deferential review which acknowledges both the
government’s unique position and accumulated expertise and its
constitutional responsibility for management of the province’s
financial affairs.25

In its precise application, the Court saw this process of deferential
review as involving a two-stage inquiry: whether there were legitimate
reasons for the rejection of the commission’s recommendations and, if
so, whether there was a “reasonable factual foundation” for those
23

[1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter “Provincial Court of Prince
Edward Island Reference”].
24
It is interesting to note that in the Court’s judgment in Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of
New Brunswick, the basis for judicial independence is said to rest in the common law and the
constitution (supra, note 22, at para. 4), and there is no specific reference to the Charter. This is in
contrast to Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island Reference, where the guarantee of
independence for the provincially appointed judges was found primarily in s. 11(d) of the Charter,
applicable by reason of the fact that such judges have extensive criminal law jurisdiction. However,
it is also worth recollecting that Lamer C.J. prefaced his judgment by accepting that the argument
for independence could also be made from the Preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 and
underlying constitutional principles. Given that there is no reference to the Charter in the more
recent case, one wonders whether the Court has now fully endorsed the alternative ground in the
earlier case and placed interference with the independence of provincially appointed judges beyond
the possibility of legislative override and the realm of a s. 1 justification, both possibilities to the
extent that the protection was solely Charter-based.
25
Supra, note 22, at para. 30.
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legitimate reasons.26 The latter inquiry is obviously deferential and while
the former does not self-evidently contain an element of deference, at
least part of the Court’s explication of what constitute legitimate reasons
does have that effect. Indeed, it defines a process as much as a review of
the merits of the reasons for rejection:
Reasons that are complete and that deal with the commission’s
recommendations in a meaningful way will meet the standard of
rationality. Legitimate reasons must be compatible with the common
law and the Constitution. The government must deal with the issues at
stake in good faith. Bald expressions of rejection or disapproval are
inadequate. Instead, the reasons must show that the commission’s
recommendations have been taken into account and must be based on
facts and sound reasoning. They must state in what respect and to what
extent they depart from the recommendations, articulating the grounds
for rejection or variation. The reasons should reveal a consideration of
the judicial office and an intention to deal with it appropriately. They
must preclude any suggestion of attempting to manipulate the
judiciary. The reasons must reflect the underlying public interest in
having a commission process, being the depoliticization of the
remuneration process and the need to preserve judicial independence.27

In many ways, the concept of legitimacy in this setting is met by
adherence to a heightened sense of what constitutes adequate reasons
under the common law prescription of an obligation to give reasons
endorsed authoritatively for the first time in Baker v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration)28 as part of the common law governing
statutory authorities.
Returning to Suresh, the Court also makes it clear there that
deference to executive or tribunal discretion will intrude indirectly in the
determination of what fundamental justice requires in a procedural
sense. While the Court has seemingly accepted that, as a matter of
general law, the standard of review for procedural questions is that of
correctness,29 what the Court has also done is provide a list of factors or
considerations that have to be taken into account in evaluating the extent
of a statutory authority’s procedural obligations. These factors, first

26

Id., at paras. 30-33.
Id., at para. 25.
28
[1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 [hereinafter “Baker”].
29
Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.) v. Ontario (Minister of Labour),
[2003] S.C.J. No. 28, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539, at para. 100 (per Binnie J.).
27
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fully articulated in the leading case of Baker, include the procedural
choices made by any authority exercising a broad discretion over such
matters or having field expertise in relation to such determinations.30
This is undoubtedly a case of expertise intruding through the back door.
In Suresh, the Court made it clear that the Baker factors governed even
in situations where procedural claims had a constitutional dimension, as
under section 7 of the Charter, albeit with emphasis given to the fact that
the procedural entitlement stemmed from a constitutional guarantee as
opposed to a “mere” statutory or common law source.31
Other section 7 case law also apparently supports judicial deference
to discretionary judgments affecting the right to life, liberty and security
of the person. Pinet v. St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital32 provides an
illustration. At stake here was the judgment exercised by Review Boards
with respect to the continued detention of those found not guilty of
criminal offences by reason of insanity. With respect to the legal
meaning of the term “least onerous and least restrictive to the accused”,
there is no doubt that the Court conducted correctness review in
determining that, as a matter of law or statutory interpretation, this
applied to the possible range of custodial conditions within a particular
institution. However, had the Review Board got that determination
correct in this particular case, Binnie J., delivering the judgment of the
Court, made it clear that it would have been entitled to considerable
deference in terms of its actual exercise of discretion as to the patient’s
conditions of custody:
The job of the appellate court is not to reweigh the evidence, nor
to substitute our views for those of the Review Board. We accept the
findings of the Review Board with regard to the appellant and other
relevant circumstances, which are supported by the evidence. The
problem is that the result was skewed by the Review Board’s error of
law.33

The Court also makes reference to another of its decisions in this
same arena, R. v. Owen34 and states that there

30
31
32
33
34

Baker, supra, note 28, at para. 27.
Supra, note 10, at para. 114.
[2003] S.C.J. No. 66, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 528 [hereinafter “Pinet”].
Id., at para. 27.
[2003] S.C.J. No. 31, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 779.
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. . . [it] acknowledged the expertise of the members appointed to
Review Boards, and established that their views of how best to
manage the risks posed by a particular NCR accused should not be
interfered with so long as the conditions of detention lie within a range
of reasonable judgment.35

The message seems clear: When Charter rights and freedoms are at
stake, statutory authorities must get the law correct; however, thereafter,
their judgments about the facts and exercises of discretion based on
those facts are entitled to deference or respect by the Court. In other
words, the Court is eschewing the micromanaging, in the name of
correctness review, of bodies such as Review Boards, the work of which
invariably involves a Charter right or freedom. Indeed, though this is
probably to extrapolate too much from the judgment in Pinet, it might
conceivably also be seen as an answer to the question left open in
Suresh: By what standard should the courts conduct a review of
executive discretions to deport someone who is a threat to national
security, even when there is a substantial threat of torture? To the extent
that this is a decision that involves factual inquiries and determinations
and the balancing of a range of competing factors, the statutory
authority’s decision is entitled to a considerable measure of deference,
provided it is operating within the correct legal standards.36
Another way of describing such a review regime, from an
Administrative Law perspective, would be to state that under a
pragmatic and functional analysis, questions of pure constitutional law
will always be reviewed on a correctness basis. In terms of the elements
in that analysis, the nature of the question and considerations of
comparative expertise coalesce to indicate that the statutory authority
has no entitlement to deference. However, when the issues cease to be
pure questions of law and engage the fact-finding capacities of the

35

Supra, note 32, at para. 22.
In both Suresh and Pinet, however, there is a complicating element. Clearly, in Suresh,
the Court is of the view that deportation to torture should be an exceptional event (at para. 78). In
Pinet, the Court also expressed the view that the s. 7 rights of the applicant should be a “major
preoccupation of the Review Board” (at para. 19). Both amount to apparent legal constraints or
limitations on the discretion of the decision-maker. As such, presumably, any review of the exercise
of each of these discretions then becomes that much more intrusive in that the reviewing court is
required to ask, in the one case, whether the discretion was exercised in a frame of mind that saw
deportation to torture as an exceptional occurrence and, in the other, whether the Review Board did
have a “major preoccupation” with the liberty interest of the applicant. While that does not mean
correctness review, it certainly narrows the frame of reference within which the decision-maker is
entitled to deference in exercising judgment as opposed to finding facts.
36
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statutory authority and/or the exercise of discretion or judgment that
engages their expertise, the fact that constitutional rights and freedoms
are in issue does not automatically mean correctness review; there is
room for deference at least in some contexts. It is not, of course, at this
point to make a judgment on whether this is appropriate or a good thing;
it simply describes how cases in which constitutional questions arise are
accommodated within the standard review practices of the courts in
Administrative Law cases.

III. MULTANI — THE MINORITY JUDGMENT
Indeed, this point of view corresponds very much to that advanced by
two members of the Court in the very recent judgment in Multani v.
Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys.37 There, in a judgment
concurring in the outcome reached by the majority, Deschamps and
Abella JJ. proposed that the general principles of judicial review of
administrative action should apply to all exercises of discretion,
including those that engage Charter rights and freedoms. Indeed, they
found support for that position,38 not in Suresh, Ahani and Pinet, but in
two other judgments of the Court, Trinity Western University v. British
Columbia College of Teachers39 and Chamberlain v. Surrey School
District No. 36,40 as well as more general references to Baker.41 They
also argued, as advanced above, that the cases in which the Court had
accepted that correctness was the invariable standard of review where

37

[2006] S.C.J. No. 6, 2006 SCC 6 [hereinafter “Multani”].
Id., at para. 94.
39
[2001] S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 [hereinafter “Trinity Western”]. Here, as a
prelude to reviewing an accreditation process that involved an apparent collision of Charter rights
and freedoms, the Court conducted a pragmatic and functional analysis to determine the standard
for review of the College’s decision and reached the conclusion that it should be correctness: at
paras. 15-19.
40
[2002] S.C.J. No. 87, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710 [hereinafter “Chamberlain”]. In this instance,
the majority in fact never reached the Charter challenge, but rather decided the case on the basis of
Administrative Law principles using an unreasonableness standard of review.
41
Multani, supra, note 37, at para. 86, referring to Baker, supra, note 28, at para. 56, and,
in particular, L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s oft-quoted statement that discretion must be exercised
. . . in accordance with the boundaries imposed in the statute, the principles of the rule of
law, the principles of administrative law, the fundamental values of Canadian society, and
the principles of the Charter.
This statement in fact raises another issue about deference: What impact does Multani have in cases
where the argument is not so much that there has been a Charter violation but that discretion has
been exercised without regard for Charter “values”?
38
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constitutional questions were at stake were all ones involving challenges
to the validity of a provision, not a decision.
[W]e do not believe that Martin established a rule that simply raising
an argument based on human rights makes administrative law
inapplicable, or that all decisions contested under the Canadian
Charter or provincial human rights legislation are subject to the
correctness standard.42

Multani involved a challenge to a decision by a school board’s
governing board and council of commissioners overturning an initial
decision by the administrative officials of the board that a student could
wear an authentic kirpan at school under certain conditions,
notwithstanding the school’s Code of Conduct that prohibited the
carrying of weapons. At stake was whether this was an abuse of
discretion on the part of the governing board and council of
commissioners, particularly if the matter in issue engaged the student’s
freedom of religion under section 2(a) of the Charter.
According to Deschamps and Abella JJ., it was not only preferable
but also, as a matter of Charter theory, mandatory for the Court to
approach this question within a standard Administrative Law review
framework and, more particularly, against the backdrop of a pragmatic
and functional analysis.
What did this mean in terms of carrying out the review function on
the facts of this case? For the two judges, there was a potential contest
between the student’s freedom of religion and the “right of all students
to physical inviolability”.43 It was also a balancing exercise that might
turn out differently as among different schools. Factual assessment was
integral to the exercise.
Where safety in the schools under its responsibility is concerned, the
respondent school board unquestionably has greater expertise than
does a court of law reviewing its decision. If the reasonableness
standard applied in Chamberlain, there is even more reason to
conclude that it applies in the instant case because of the factual
element associated with the determinations of safety requirements.44

42
43
44

Multani, supra, note 37, at para. 93.
Id., at para. 96.
Id., at para. 96.
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The duo then proceeded to analyze the discretionary determination
of the council of commissioners by reference to the reasonableness
standard and concluded that its decision was unreasonable because it
“did not sufficiently consider either the right to freedom of religion or
the accommodation measure proposed by the father and the student”.45
For Deschamps and Abella JJ., this was a much more apt process
than trying to accommodate review of administrative discretions that
implicated Charter rights and freedoms within the framework of the
Oakes46 (and its progeny’s) formula for assessing justifications of
constitutional violations by reference to section 1. Indeed, they saw that
process of constitutional justification as “developed uniquely” for the
assessment of a “norm of general application”. It was not apt for the
evaluation of the individualized decisions of statutory authorities and
would only lead to an unsatisfactory “blurring [of] the distinction
between the principles of constitutional justification and the principles
of administrative law” in a way that would result in “the impairment of
the analytical tools developed specifically for each of these fields”.47
Indeed, the joint judgment goes even further in asserting that the
Court got it wrong in cases such as Slaight Communications Inc. v.
Davidson48 to the extent that it accepted that section 1 had relevance to
individualized exercises of statutory powers. In so doing, Deschamps
and Abella JJ. revisited the old debate as to the meaning of the term
“prescribed by law” in section 1 and urged that the Court reverse the
position that this threshold to the very applicability of section 1 engaged
anything other than a statute, regulation, or other binding normative
instrument. More particularly, it should not be read to include as “law”
for these purposes the determination or decision of a statutory authority.
“Law” and the possibility of a justification for constitutional violations
should be restricted to “rules of general application”.49

IV. MULTANI — THE MAJORITY JUDGMENT
However, the majority of the Court rejected this position. Justice
Charron (McLachlin C.J., Bastarache, Binnie and Fish JJ. concurring)
45
46
47
48
49

Id., at para. 99.
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter “Oakes”].
Multani, supra, note 37, at para. 85.
[1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1308.
Multani, supra, note 37, at paras. 112-25.
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asserted that the duo courted the risk of “reduc[ing] the fundamental
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Canadian Charter to mere
administrative law principles or, at the very least, caus[ing] confusion
between the two”.50 Rather, the integrity of the Charter would be
maintained only if the Court itself defined the scope of the protection
offered by its rights and freedoms and, in the event of a violation, only
upheld the governmental action if it met the requirements of section 1.
In this realm, particularly as the case was based entirely on the
constitutional right to freedom of religion, there was no room for the
intrusion of the Administrative Law standard of “unreasonableness”.
Where the challenge was to an administrative decision “based on the
application and interpretation of the Canadian Charter”,51 the Supreme
Court’s own jurisprudence dictated correctness review.
In elaborating, the majority then went on to assert that unless the
Court was being asked to reconcile two constitutional rights by drawing
internal limits on the scope of freedom of religion, any concerns with
competing values should be left to the section 1 contextual analysis.52 In
other words, any non-constitutional interests of the state in reining in
religious freedom was not the proper subject of a balancing exercise at
the infringement stage but could only play a role as part of a section 1
justification where the onus was clearly on the state. The task of the
person claiming an infringement of the right was to show
(1) that he or she sincerely believes in a practice or belief that has a
nexus with religion, and (2) that the impugned conduct of a third party
interferes, in a manner that is non-trivial or not insubstantial, with his
or her ability to act in accordance with that practice or belief.53

Then, in the application of those standards to the facts of the case, the
majority did its own apparent de novo assessment of the evidence on the
record and came to the conclusion that the student had met both
preconditions. Moreover, particularly when it is juxtaposed against the
judgment of the Court of Appeal,54 it also looks like acceptance of the
legitimacy of correctness review of the statutory authority’s determination
50

Id., at para. 16.
Id., at para. 20. However, Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin,
[2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 [hereinafter “Martin”] was the only authority cited.
52
Multani, supra, note 37, at para. 29.
53
Id., at para. 34.
54
Multani v. Commission scolaire de Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2004] J.Q. no 1904, 241
D.L.R. (4th) 336 (C.A.).
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of the student’s claims for exemption from or accommodation in the
application of the no weapons rule on the basis of religious belief. For the
Quebec Court of Appeal, Lemelin J. (ad hoc) had assessed the statutory
authority’s decision not to support accommodation of the student’s
religious belief on the basis of an unreasonableness standard of review.55
The majority of the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the contention that
the statutory authority was entitled to any degree of deference and then
did its own assessment of the evidence and arguments on the critical
elements of the claim of violation.
Not surprisingly, the same is true of the next stage of the process:
the consideration of the section 1 justification. Certainly, Charron J.
gives the standard nod in favour of not demanding perfection of
legislators and decision-makers at the minimal impairment stage of the
Oakes test proportionality analysis: “the courts must accord some
leeway”.56 In deciding whether there has been minimal impairment,
“perfection” is not demanded, only a solution that comes “within a
range of reasonable alternatives”.57 However, in its subsequent
consideration of all of the statutory authority’s arguments and, in
particular, the claim that nothing short of an absolute ban would do to
fulfill legitimate objectives, the majority judgment engages in a full
evaluation of the evidence and the arguments with not a whiff of
deference or suggestion that there might be room for another opinion or
assessment of the situation. In short, an absolute ban did not come close
in the Court’s mind to the kind of reasonable alternative that might
justify some measure of deference at the minimal impairment stage.
Where does this leave the law with respect to the role of deference
in Charter cases? Are the Court’s decisions and reasoning in cases such
as Ahani, Suresh and Pinet reconcilable with the majority judgment in
Multani? I suppose it might be contended that the group of three are
section 7 cases and Multani is a section 2(a) freedom of religion case. It
might also be contended that given the apparently very short shrift that
the governing board and council of commissioners gave to Multani’s
freedom of religion assertion, the Court had no alternative but to
conduct correctness review or its own assessment of the merits of the
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Multani, supra, note 37, at paras. 10-12.
Id., at para. 50, quoting from RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General),
[1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 160.
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claim. There is simply no entitlement to deference when the statutory
authority in effect does not face up to a constitutional or Charter claim
or fails to deal with it within the legal framework that the Court’s
Charter jurisprudence demands.
However, neither of those attempts at distinguishing is really all that
plausible. First, I do not see any relevant difference for these purposes
between decision-making that engages the section 7 guarantees of
fundamental justice when life, liberty and security of the person are at
stake and decision-making that implicates freedom of religion.
Secondly, the majority is quite dogmatic: Administrative Law standards
and principles have no application in cases where the courts are
assessing exercises of statutory power against the guarantees provided
by the Charter. There is no sense in the elaboration that the situation
might vary as among various provisions of the Charter or be affected by
the extent to which (if at all) the statutory authority has itself addressed
the Charter issues. Rather, the standard of review is that of correctness.
Indeed, the majority makes it clear that it rejects the minority’s
perspective that automatic correctness review only applies in cases
where the court is considering the validity of legislation as opposed to
the validity of decisions taken under legislation. Not only does the Court
affirm the application of Martin and its assertion of correctness review
in the context of individualized decision-making and discretionary
exercises of power, but it also refers with approval to the following
statement in Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15:58
As the Court recognized, “an administrative tribunal acting pursuant to
its delegated powers exceeds its jurisdiction if it makes an order that
infringes the Charter”. . . . 59

Indeed, at the risk of inappropriately re-insinuating the principles of
Administrative Law which Multani explicitly outlaws, I would venture to
say that what the majority is in effect doing is making the assertion that
Charter questions always go to jurisdiction and attract correctness review
whether it is a matter of pure law, mixed law and fact, or pure fact.
In short, it is my view that the judgment in Multani cannot coexist
with the three earlier judgments where the Court accepted the legitimacy
of some degree of deference to at least certain species of individualized
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[1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825.
Multani, supra, note 37, at para. 17, quoting from id., at para. 31.
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decision-making that implicated Charter rights and freedoms.60 The pity,
of course, is that the Court does not at any point refer to any one of
these three judgments. It is also, in my view, the case that these three
judgments do not find a true surrogate in the judgment of the duo, so
directly or explicitly rejected by the majority. In particular, there is no
suggestion in any of the three that section 1 has no relevance to
situations of individualized decision-making. Indeed, Suresh certainly
contemplates a continued role for section 1 in such cases. In other
words, what the Court did in these three cases in no way carries with it
the implication that Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson61 is
incorrect in its reading of “prescribed by law” to include the actual
outcomes of individualized decision-making. The theory and practice of
deference articulated in these three cases in no way requires acceptance
of the duo’s sweeping away of that part of Charter law.62

V. RESOLVING THE DILEMMA
If I am accurate in my assessment that there can be no reconciliation
between Multani and the other three decisions to which I refer, what is
to be done? It is, after all, quite problematic to have the Court espousing
two inconsistent theories of the relationship between Constitutional and
Administrative Law review and to simply leave the matter of which one
has purchase in a particular case to apparently random selection. What is
clearly demanded of the Court is that on an appropriate occasion (and, it
is to be hoped, sooner rather than later), it recognize the dilemma and
come up with an overarching vision of how, if at all, courts should
accommodate concepts of deference in constitutional litigation.
Moreover, as my colleague David Stratas has pointed out,63 any such
60
Interestingly, while Charron J. does mention both Chamberlain, supra, note 40, and
Trinity Western, supra, note 39, she never does contest Deschamps and Abella JJ.’s
characterization of those two decisions as supporting the place of deference where the exercise of
discretion implicates Charter rights and freedoms.
61
Supra, note 48.
62
Indeed, one of the consequences of the duo’s theory would be to discourage rule-making
by administrative agencies. If an agency confines itself to making policy incrementally through
individualized decision-making, under the duo’s theory, it has a considerable chance of attracting
deference for each of those individualized decisions. If, on the other hand, the agency engages in
rule-making and thereby establishes norms, it opens itself up to correctness review and having to
bear the onus that s. 1 places to justify itself when it adopts rules that impinge on Charter rights and
freedoms.
63
In discussion.
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overall evaluation must take account not only, on the one hand, of the
role of deference in sections 91 and 92 litigation but also, on the other
hand, that the Court typically affords no deference to individualized
decision-making by public officials when it deals with section 8 search
and seizure issues in a criminal context, in this instance police officers
determining whether or not to conduct a search. It is only against the
backdrop of such a realization of the varying contexts in which this can
become an issue that the Court is likely to come up with a coherent
theory which can be drawn on irrespective of context.
In all of this, there is, of course, no gainsaying the majority position
in Multani that full, correctness review of any administrative
determination that affects Charter rights and freedoms could have the
tendency to increase the occasions on which the Charter will provide
“protection”. However, there is another reality that emerges very clearly
from a consideration of the impact of applying Multani in situations
such as those which arose in Pinet. If correctness review becomes the
order of the day in all Charter contexts, including the determination of
factual issues and the application of the law to those facts, then what in
effect can occur is that the courts will perforce assume the role of a de
novo appellate body from all tribunals the task of which is to make
decisions that of necessity have an impact on Charter rights and
freedoms: Review Boards, Parole Boards, prison disciplinary tribunals,
child welfare authorities and the like. Whether that kind of judicial
micromanaging of aspects of the administrative process should take
place is a highly problematic question. It is one that should not be taken
to have been decided by default in Multani and its blanket rejection of
any room for the principles of Administrative Law and its standard of
review analysis in Charter cases.
In Multani, at least one member of the Court, LeBel J., recognized
that there were problems with making sweeping assertions of the kind
emanating from both the majority and the duo:
Although I agree with the disposition proposed by my colleagues, I
remain concerned about some aspects of the problems of legal
methodology raised by this case. As can be seen, the case involves
diverse legal concepts that, although belonging to fields of law that are
in principle separate, are still part of a single legal system the
coherence of which must be adequately ensured.
...
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The approaches followed to apply the Canadian Charter must be
especially flexible when it comes to working out the relationship
between administrative law and constitutional law.64

This expression of concern seems fully warranted upon a fuller
consideration of the Supreme Court’s own approaches to this issue in
other contexts. It is to be hoped that this will prove a lifeline for counsel
wishing to assert in a later case that standard of review analysis and the
possibility of deference to discretionary decision-making are not always
the alien concepts that the Multani majority has asserted that they are.
It is also worth bearing in mind that the Court itself may have
already provided hints of how the dilemma might be resolved
satisfactorily. While the Court in an Administrative Law setting has
rejected the contention that it should recognize a greater gradation of
standards of review than the three currently accepted standards of
[in]correctness, unreasonableness and patent unreasonableness,65 I
assume that that has not precluded consideration of whether there needs
to be a somewhat different approach to the review of exercises of power
engaging constitutional questions and Charter rights and freedoms in
particular.
As we have seen, one way of doing this is to place greater emphasis
on the nature of the right that is at stake in either conducting a pragmatic
and functional analysis for the purposes of substantive review or, in the
domain of procedural fairness or fundamental justice, as part of the
Baker factors used to establish the strength of any claim to procedural
fairness. This would, however, involve a concession that Multani should
not be read as imposing a universal standard of correctness review on
every situation when Charter rights and freedoms are at issue
irrespective of the nature of the issue before the Court, be it law, mixed
law and fact, or fact. It would also force the issue whether, for these
purposes, the courts should acknowledge that there is a hierarchy of
constitutional rights and freedoms or at least varying levels of harm
caused by a failure to afford proper recognition to constitutional rights
and freedoms. A decision which may send someone to death and torture
at the hands of a barbarous regime may indeed have more constitutional
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Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] S.C.J. No. 17, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, at
paras. 24-26.
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significance than routine decisions about the level of security in which
those detained in psychiatric institutions are housed.
However, there is another way of creating a compromise or point in
between conceptions of deference derived from Administrative Law
(unreasonableness or patent unreasonableness review) and correctness
review. In standard judicial review, the onus rests with the applicant to
establish a basis for judicial review by reference to whatever standard is
produced by the pragmatic and functional analysis. As Provincial Court
Judges’ Assn. of New Brunswick 66 makes clear, that is not the only
framework within which deferential judicial review of discretionary
decision-making or rights determinations can take place. There, as we
have seen, the Court placed the onus on the government to justify its
rejection or modification of the recommendations of the various judicial
remuneration commissions. However, whether the government met that
onus was not contingent on it showing the correctness of its views and
the incorrectness of the commissions’ determinations. Rather, the Court
assessed its rationale for departing from those recommendations on the
basis of the manner it went about justifying its decisions: a process of
judicial evaluation that focused on the extent to which the government
gave reasons that genuinely addressed the position of the commission
and provided a rational basis for departing from it, and one that was
sustainable on a reasonable view of the facts.
While the Court does not explicitly acknowledge the work of David
Dyzenhaus, there are distinct echoes here of his theory of deference as
respect,67 a theory that L’Heureux-Dubé J. endorsed in her majority
judgment in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration).68 Reduced to its core, what the Court is calling for is a
combination of more elaborate and clearly articulated reasons and
greater attention to the rights at stake as a precondition to respect for the
agency’s judgment and expertise; a culture of justification where
constitutional questions, including those affecting Charter rights and
freedoms, are at stake.69 It is not, however, the kind of justification that
66

Supra, note 22.
David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy” in
Michael Taggart, ed., The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997), at 279.
68
[1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at para. 65.
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I should note, however, that this kind of approach has apparently been rejected by the
House of Lords in R. (on the application of Begum (by her litigation friend, Rahman)) v.
Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School, [2006] UKHL 15. This involved issues
similar to Multani: a challenge to a decision refusing to allow Begum, a Muslim, to wear a jilbab to
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forms the basis of section 1 analysis and, to that extent, this approach is
closer to that of the duo in Multani than that of the majority.
Nonetheless, it certainly does have strong claims for recognition outside
the world of judicial remuneration commissions and the protection of
the institutional independence of judges.
This notion of deference having to be earned also intrudes in the
judgment of Binnie J. in Pinet v. St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital.70
There, he makes it clear that the requirement that the reviewing Court be
restrained in its scrutiny of the Review Board’s assessments is predicated
on the Review Board approaching its task with the section 7 rights of the
detainee as “a major preoccupation”.71 In other words, the Court will be
justified in intervening if the Board has failed to take the section 7 rights
adequately into account in balancing the various considerations bearing
upon its decision. Presumably, as in Provincial Court Judges Assn. of
New Brunswick, whether that has occurred will be evaluated on the basis
of the justifications provided by the Board and the extent to which those
justifications find a reasonable basis in the facts.72
school. It was claimed that this decision unjustifiably limited her religious freedoms under article 9
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4
November 1950, and the right not to be denied an education under article 2 of the First Protocol to
the Convention. In reversing the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords rejected an approach that
evaluated “the quality of the decision-making process” (at para. 31). Rather, the reviewing Court’s
role was to focus on the practical outcome (at para. 31). However, at least some members of the
House of Lords adopted a deferential approach to the task of reviewing the decision. Thus, Lord
Bingham of Cornhill went on to state at para. 34:
It would in my opinion be irresponsible of any court, lacking the experience, background
and detailed knowledge of the head teacher, staff and governors, to overrule their judgment
on a matter as sensitive as this. The power of decision has been given to them for the
compelling reason that they are best placed to exercise it, and I see no reason to disturb their
decision. After the conclusion of argument the House was referred to the recent decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Multani . . . . That was a case decided, on quite different
facts, under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It does not cause me to alter the
conclusion I have expressed.
I am grateful to Roy Lee of the Business Law Section of the Department of Justice Canada for
drawing this decision to my attention.
70
[2003] S.C.J. No. 66, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 528.
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Id., at para. 19.
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It may also be the case that there are situations where the institutional framework that
forms the context for the judicial review application is one where there can be no reasonable
assurance that the decision-maker can or will give the Charter rights and freedoms at stake their
appropriate weight. In those instances, the Court may be completely justified in correctness review.
Thus, for example, in the context of Suresh and Ahani, where the decision-maker’s primary
concerns are the security interests of Canada, the expectation that Charter rights and freedoms will
be evaluated properly may simply not be justified at least in the absence of some internal,
independent check. If so, the correctness review may be necessary if, indeed, Charter rights and
freedoms are not to be devalued.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Multani’s assertion that correctness is the invariable standard of review
when Charter rights and freedoms are at stake is not supported by prior
Supreme Court of Canada authority and, as a matter of an appropriate
standard for the review of the exercise of discretions that engage Charter
rights and freedoms, is too blunt an approach. There is room for
deference to the discretionary judgments of statutory authorities
exercising powers that have the potential to affect Charter rights and
freedoms. To accept this is not to devalue inappropriately those Charter
rights and freedoms. However, to prevent this devaluation from
occurring, there should be recognition that the framework within which
deference operates will often, perhaps invariably, need to be different
than it is in the case of judicial review of administrative action that does
not affect Charter rights and freedoms. In my view, the genesis for this
approach can be found in the Supreme Court’s judgment in the recent
Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of New Brunswick case where the Court
requires the relevant state actor to justify its entitlement to deference
from the reviewing court by providing reasons that show a heightened
awareness of the constitutional rights at stake and a rational basis in
terms of the parameters of those rights and the facts to justify the court
exercising restraint.

